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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the interaction beteeer. union wages  and the 
internatIonal pattern of productIon and trdde.  if union goods are 
heterogeneous  in labor intensity, the Introduction of an actIve union in 
the  domestIc  country causes only tr.e  least labor-intensive range of 
union  goods to be  produced  there, with  goods of  greatest  labor Intensity 
produced abroad due to the  relatively high coat  of domestic union 
labor.  . narrowing of the scope of domestIc  union production will 
eliminate  relatively labor-intensive goods, leading a rent—maximizIng 
union  to raise  Its  union  premium.  The implications of this union 
oehavior for comparative statIcs results are considered. 
Robert  1. Staiger 
Department of  Economics 
Stanford University 
Stanford, CA 94305 I.  Introduction 
General equilibrium analysis of labor unions has taken place 
primarily within the context of closed— or small—open—economy versions 
of the two—sector neoclassIcal model.  The early contributIons to this 
literature introduce an exogenous union wage premium In one sector and 
consider the Implications for various properties of the general 
equilibrium.!t  Several recent papers have made endogenous the actions  of 
the labor union in an effort to understand both the way unions respond 
to changing international conditions and the implications of union 
behavior for broader comparative statics results,!  What has not been 
considered formally is the effect of union activity on the international 
location of production and the pattern of international trade:  that Is, 
the simultaneous determination of the union wage and the set of products 
produced by union workers. 
By modeling the union as operating In an Import—competing sector 
that produces a variety of heterogeneous goods, this paper explores the 
union's impact on the pattern of trade and, at the same time, the effect 
on union wages of shifting international patterns of production  In 
particular, It goods  within the union sector differ in the intensity 
with which they require union labor, and if the  (domestic) union wage 
premium Is an important source of international cost differences, then 
only the least labor—intensive range of union—sector goods will be 
produced domestically, with goods of greatest labor intensity being 
produced abroad as a result of the relatively high cost of domestic 
union labor.  With goods arranged in order of increasing labor —2— 
intensity, the Identity of the "marginal" good——the good of highest 
labor Intensity that is produoed In the domestic union sector——will be 
determined by the sIze of the domestIc union wage premium:  it defines 
the scope of domestic production in the union sector, and hence the 
range of domestic export goods, as a function of union behavior. 
However, the scope of domestic union—sector production will itself 
affect the sectoral labor intensity of production, on which the wage 
premium of a rent-maximizing union depends.1"  As such, when a union 
supplies labor for the production of heterogeneous goods, the union wage 
premium and the pattern of international trade will be determined 
simultaneously. 
The key ingredients  of the  formal model developed below to explore 
the link between trade patterns and union behavior are that countries 
differ only with respect to their degree of'  union activity, that goods 
produced with union labor are heterogeneous in the intensity with which 
their production requires w-iion labor, and that there is a single labor 
union setting a uniform wage across goods of the "union sector."  The 
first assumption is extreme, but represents a modeling technique that 
has proved useful in highlighting the contributions of such determinants 
as endowments and technology to the pattern of' international trade../ 
The second assumption approximates an industry—wide union, such as the 
United Auto Workers or the United Steel Workers, whose members produce a 
variety of'  products.  Finally, the assumption of a single union is made 
to keep the model simple.  Extending the model to include many unions 
operating within the union sector is discussed in a footnote. —3— 
The  particular  framework  upon  which  the  analysis  rests  15  a  variant 
of the two—country continuum—of-goods Ricardian model of Dornbusch, 
Fischer, and Samuelson (1977),  and is similar in some respects to the 
model developed in Dixit and Grossman (1982).  There are two final—goods 
sectors and a non—traded Intermediate good sector.  In the union sector, 
firms combine unionized labor and the intermediate good in different 
proportions to produce the various goods of the sector.  For 
concreteness, this sector might be thought of as the automobile 
industry, the union as the UAW, and the various goods within the sector 
as the array of different models produced.  The goods in the non—union 
sector are produced with combinations of non—union labor and the 
Intermediate good and can, without loss of generality, be ag'egated 
into one non—union good.  The intermediate good is non—traded and is 
produced in the intermediate good sector with non—union labor alone.  To 
neutralize any Ricardian basis for international trade, technological 
differences between countries that would lead to comparative advantage 
are assumed to be absent:  only the operation of a labor union in the 
domestic country distinguishes it from the foreign country.  Finally, 
the domestic labor union is assumed to organize workers in the domestic 
union sector and to choose a single rent-maximizing wage at which Its 
members will be hired to produce the heterogeneous goods of the sector. 
The relationship between the union wage premium and the pattern of 
production and trade that emerges from this model has important 
implications for the model's comparative statics results.  Since the 
aggregate labor intensity of the domestic union sector Is increasing In —14— 
the scope of domestic production, the wage premium of a rent-maxinizing 
doemstic labor Uflion will rise in response to increased "1ntensity' of 
foreign competition.  Consequently, the scope of domestic production 
takes on a sIgnificance of its own,  and the effects of labor migration, 
demand shifts, and technological change  will be altered according to 
their respective impacts on domestic production.  In this way, union 
activity can alter in a systematIc way the standard comparative statics 
results familiar from competitive Ricardian trade theory. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows,  After developing 
the model in section II,  section III  illustrates the effect of an active 
union on comparative statics results of the Ricardian model by 
considering the  union response to a decline In demand for union 
products, to a policy of directing R&D efforts into the union sector, 
and to international  labor migration.  Section IV concludes. 
II.  The Model 
The  continuum—of-goods Ricardian model of Dornbusch, Fischer, and 
Samuelson (1977)  yields strong comparative statics results concerning 
the effects of changes in technology, tastes, and national labor 
endowments on the terms of trade, relative and real wages, and the scope 
of production in each of the two countries of the model.  A convenient 
graphical representation of the model is developed by the authors to 
provide a simple and intuitive method for determining the equilibrium 
and generating comparative statics results.  The purpose of this section 
is to develop a  pair of diagrams which together characterize the —5— 
world trade equilibrium in the presence of a rent—maximizing labor union 
in the domestic country.  This Is accomplished in two steps.  First, the 
model is solved given an exogenous union wage premium.  Then union 
behavior is explicitly considered, and the general equilibrium of the 
model is obtained. 
Union Wage Premium Exogenous 
Located in each of the two countries of the model are two final 
goods sectors and an intermediate good sector.  The Intermediate good, 
whIch will be called "capital" and which is nontraded by assumption, is 
used as an input into the production of final goods, and is produced 
with non—union labor alone according to a linear  homogenous technology 
common to both countries.  Define units of the capital good so that one 
unit of labor produces one unit of capital in either country.  Let  r 
and  w,  respectively, be the price of the capital good and the wage of 
non-union labor at home, and define  r*  and  w*  similarly abroad, all 
measured in any common unit.  Then perfect competition will ensure that 
r.w;r*w*  (1) 
as long as the capital good is produced in both countries. 
The two traded—goods sectors employ labor and capital to produce 
final goods for consumption.  Consider first the domestic economy. 
Goods of the non-union sector are produced  with combinations of non- 
union labor and capital according to linear homogenous technologies. 
Since the relative price of factors used in this sector Is fixed by (1), 
competition keeps the relative prices of goods produced in the non—union —6— 
sector fixed as well.  Under the assumption that subutility over the 
non—union  goods is homothetic, a composite non—union good can be defined 
whose production requires inputs of capital and non—union labor in fixed 
p'oportions.  This composite non—union good will be called good 2. 
The union sector contains a continuum of goods indexed by  zcCO,1 
and produced under constant returns to scale by combining capital and 
union labor in fixed proportions.  The assumption of Leontief 
technologies in the union sector is primarily for graphical convenience, 
though its implications for the endogenous determination of the union 
wage premium will be discussed below./  Goods in the union sector are 
Indexed according to increasing labor intensity, and the ratio of labor 
to capital, while uniquely fixed for any good, is assumed to vary 
continuously between zero and infinity as  z  goes from zero to one. 
Finally, domestic preferences over the entire set of consumption goods 
zCEO,1J, 2)  are assumed to be Cobb—Douglas. 
Now consIder the foreign country.  As noted above, technology for 
producing the capital good is Identical at home and abroad.  Further, 
assume that the Cobb—Douglas  preferences  over the final goods are shared 
by  both  countries.  Finally,  to neutralize  any Ricardian  basis for 
trade, It. is assumed that, In the production of final goods,  an economy— 
wide efficiency differential exists between the domestic and foreign 
countries which may give rise to an absolute but not to a comparative 
advantage,  That is,  defining  9.(z)  and  k(z)  as  labor and capital 
requirements, respectively, for unit production of good  z  in the —7— 
domestic country, and defining  t*(z) and  k*(z)  analogously for the 
foreign country, It is assumed that 
t*(z)  e2.(z)  (2) 
k*(z)  ek(z)  ZE{EO,1L 2} 
where  e  measures the efficiency differential between domestic and 
foreign production of final  goods.  A rise in  e  corresponds to an 
Increase in the relative efficiency of domestic producers. 
In the absence of a domestic union wage premium, condition (2) 
implies that there will exist no basis for trade between the two 
countries.  A single equilibrium wage  w  will be earned by all  domestic 
labor, while  w*  will be earned by labor abroad.  Given (1) and (2), 
and assuming the absence of transportation costs,  relative wages at home 
and abroad must In equilibrium satisfy 
(3) 
since otherwise one country would have a cost advantage In the 
production of all traded goods.  Under equilibrium condition (3), 
neither country has a cost advantage In the production of any good and, 
as a result, the international pattern of production is completely 
arbitrary. 
The introduction of a domestic union wage premium provides the 
basis for trade between the two countries.  A two—quadrant version of 
the Lerner—Pearce diagram familiar from L-{ecksoher—Ohlln trade theory can —8— 
be used to illustrate the no-trade equilibrium and how the existence of 
a domestic union wage premium gives rise to international  trade.  With 
labor measured on the horizontal axis and capital measured on the 
vertical axis, the right and left quadrants of Figure 1  depict the unIt 
isocost lines and unit value isoquants that obtain In the union sector 
and the non—union sector, respectively, in the absence of a union wage 
premium.  For graphical convenIence,  e  Is set to unity Implying that 
technologies are Identical in the two countries. 
In the absence of' a  domestic union wage premium, and with  e  set 
to one, (3) implies  that, in equilibrium,  domestic and foreign wages 
will  be identical.  Normalizing  this common wage to unity and using (1), 
the unit isocost lIne pictured in each quadrant of Figure 1  is shared by 
both countries and intersects each axis of  the two—quadrant Lerner— 
Pearce diagram at one, reflecting the reciprocal of the unitary wage 
paid to labor in each sector and the reciprocal of the unitary price of 
capital,  Cobb—Douglas preferences imply that each good will be demanded 
and thus produced somewhere In the free trade equilibrium, so that final 
goods prices will adjust to ensure that every unit value isoquant just 
touches the unit Isocost line In Its sector.  Since  the unit value 
isoquants  and  unit isocost lines are shared by the  two countries,  zero— 
profit production of any good can occur in either country, and as such, 
the International location for the production of any final good will be 
completely arbitrary. 
Finally, recall that,  In the union sector,  each  good  z  Is assumed 
to be  produced  with a unique ratio of labor to capital; this too is —9— 
reflected in Figure  1.  In particular,  the ratio  Fzo  for any 
Z' £ (0,1]  can be read from the right-hand quadrant of Figure 1  as the 
inverse of the slope of the ray from the origin through the point on the 
carve labeled  ZZ  that lies vertioally above  z'  •  Under  the assaption 
that the labor-capital  ratio is continuous and monotonically increasing 
in  z  over the interval  z a (0,1]  with  C0) • 0  and 
F" • .,  the  U  ourve,  which associates with each  z a  :0,1]  a 
labor—capital ratio in the way  described above, will intersect the 
horizontal axis at one,  be continuous over  2 £  (0,1],  and have 
negative but finite slope. 
Plow  consider the introduction of an exogenous union wags  presiam, 
U)  V  ,  ,chich raises above one the wags paid to labor employed in 
the domestic union sector,  a.  Since the domestic anion wags is now 
higher than the unitary wags abroad, the domestic price of capital must 
fall below  one if the  anion sector is to continue to operate at all in 
the domestic country.  This implies, using (1), that the domestic non— 
anion wage mast. fall.  In fact, for  any given union premius, the level 
of the domestic non—union  wage will determine completely the scope of 
domestic production and the pattern of international trade.  This is 
depicted in Figure 2. 
With the foreign wags still normalized to unity, the foreign mit 
isocost lines continue to intersect each axis of the Lerner—Pearce 
diagram at one.  The domestic unit isocost line in the non—union  sector 
will  now  be gives  by a line such as  in the left quadrant of Figure 
2, with vertical intercept  3. 
wtaere  3> 
—  1,  and  horizontal —  10 
Intercept  where  .  by ().  The  domestic  unit  Isocost  line  In 
the  union  sector  will  be given by the line  dd  in Figure 2, With 
vertical intercept  .,  horizontal  intercept  where 
<  1  ,  and slope 
— L], The exact position of  ed  and  dd 
for any union premium will depend on the level of the domestic non—union 
wage  w,  which can be determined once the  demand side of the model is 
completed. 
Finally, goods prices  will eliminate profits in equilibrium.  In 
the left quadrant of Figure 2, the unit value isoquant will move out 
along a radial path from the origin until  Its vertex lies on the 
outermost unit isocost line, that at'  the domestic country.  Accordingly, 
the non—union good will be produced domestically.  Similarly, each unit 
value isoquant In the right quadrant will move along a radial path from 
the origin until its vertex lies on the convex  hull of the two unit iso— 
cost lines,  The good labeled  in Figure 2 is the 'marginal" good 
whose production can occur in either  country in equilibrium, all goods 
z  a E0,')  produced at home and all goods  z a  (!,1]  produced abroad. 
Consequently, In the presence of a domestic labor union, the domestic 
country specializes in the production of the non—union good,  and in the 
capital intensive goods of the union sector, 
The real wage effects of the domestic labor union can also be read 
from Figure 2.  The foreign nominal wage  w*  is unchanged at its 
normalized value of unity,  Prices of goods  z a  are also 
unchanged relative to  w*.  However, prices of goods  zcEO,),2} have 
fallen relative to  w as a result of the domestic union wage prefnluzn, —  ii — 
as  reflected in the outward radial shift of the unit value isoquants for 
these goods.  Therefore, foreign labor gains In real terms from the 
unionization of the domestic labor force.  This  occurs  because the 
domestic union wage premium has provided the basis for trade between the 
two countries, and foreign labor enjoys the benefits of t'is trade.  The 
real wage of those employed in the domestIc union sector rises by an 
even greater amount, sInce  increases ralatlve to the foreIgn wage 
w*,  However, the domestic labor union causes the wage of laborers 
employed in the domestic nonunIon sector to fall In real terms wIth 
respect to every good except  zc{O,2}  whlcn by assumption use only 
nonun1on labor in their productIon, and whose prices therefore move In 
tandem with the domestic non-union wage  w.  Hence, for any union aage 
premIum and domestic non-union wage, the Lerner-pearce dIagram of FIg're 
2 can be used to determine the pattern of production and trade, and the 
real returns to factors In the two countries. 
The next step Is to determine the domestIc non—unIon wage  w  as a 
function of the exogenous union wage premium.  To begin, the margInal 
good  !  can be defined Implicitly  by setting the production cost of  Z 
equal in the two countries,  With the foreign wage normalized to one, 
and using the fact that  r  w  by (1),  will be an implicit functIon 
of  w  and  e  and of the domestIc union wage premium  p  as given by 
i(Z) + k()J  e[i(Z) ÷ k(Z)J  () —  12 
— 
Expression -)  can be manipulated to yield 
(1-p)(1-)  e  (5) 
— -  (1-p) 
Define  f()  (.).  Then  (5) can be solved for  2  as 
(1-p)(1)  e) 
(6) 
- (1-p) 
Since the labor-capital ratio is by assumption continuous and 
monotonically Increasing in  z  over the interval  z  c CO,1]  with 
(O) 
= C  and  (1) 
=  ,  f(•)  will be continuous and monotonically 
increasing in its argument with  f(O) = 0  and  f()  1.  As such, 
expression (6)  implies that, for any  0 < p < 1,  w  must satisfy 
e(1  — p)  < w  < e.  If  w  e,  2  0  by (6) and the domestic country 
produces only the non-union good:  on the other hand,  w  must be 
strictly less than  e(1 — p)  since If  w  e(1  — p),  then by (6), 
2  1  and the domestic country would produce everything.  Finally, 
inspection  of (6) reveals that  2  is a continuous and decreasing 
function of  w  and of  p,  and an Increasing function of  e,  or 
(—)  (—)  (4.) 
2  =  w,  p,  e  ) 
(7) 
Next, define  r(Z(w,p,e),b(2))  as the fraction of income  spent 
(anywhere) on those goods In which the home country has a comparative 
advantage, or —  13  — 
Z(w, p,e) 
F(Z(w,p,e),b(2))  b(2) +  b(z)dz  (8) 
where  b(2)  is the budget share alloted to consumption of good 2, and 
b(z)dz  is the budget share alloted to consumption of union sector goods 
z c  Ez, z  + dzj  .  Then  I  — r(•)  is the fraction of income  spent 
(anywhere) on goods produced abroad.  The properties of  !(w,p,e)  noted 
in (7) and the non—negativity of  b(z)  imply that  r((w,p,e),b(2))  is 
non—increasing in both  w  and  p,  and nondecreasing in  a  and  b(2). 
Finally, using the fact that preferences  are Cobb—Douglas, the 
fraction of world income captured by the domestic labor union in the 
form of union rents is given by  R(Z(w,p,e),p)  defined as 
(w  p,e) 
R((w,p,e),p)  p  b(z) 
i(z) 
]dz  (9) 
i(z)  (l—p)k(z) 
F(Z(w,p,e),b(2)) — R(Z(w,p,e),p)  is then the fraction of world income 
received by the domestic labor force, net of'  union rents. 
With  L  and  L defined as the domestic and foreign labor force, 
respectively, and with  w*  normalized to one, domestic income  Y  will 
be given by 
WI.  + R(!(w,p,e),p)L*  '10) 
1  — R(!(w,p,e),p) 
The equilibrium value of the domestic non—union wage,  , is then 
determined by the balanced trade condition —  11  — 
—  r(Z(p,e)b(2))]  Y  r(z(,p,e),b(2flL* 
or 
=  ()  B(!(p,e),p,b(2),  (11) 
For any exogenous value of the union wage premium,  p,  the equlibriurn 
domestic non—union wage can be found as the solution to (ii), 
Lemma:  A unique  exists for any  0 K p  < 1,  provided that 
b(2)  L* 
e 
1-b(2)  L 
Proof:  From their respective definitions  it follows immediately that 
for  0<  p <1, 
r((e,p,e),b(2))  = b(2) 
R(!(=e,p,e),p)  0 
r((=e(1-p),p,e),b(2)) 
I 
R(!(e(1—p),p,e),p)  <  1 
Conmequently, 
B(f(e,p,e),p,b(2  1-b(2) 
<  e 
(13) 
B((=e(i—p),p,e),p,b(2),  f—) 
= —  15  — 
In addition,  [r(.)  — R(•)]  can be rewritten as 
Z(w,  Q,e) 
[r(.) - R(.)]  b(2)  (l-p)  b(z)  [L(Z) 
dz  (1k) 
Since  Z(w,p,e)  is decreasing and continuous in  w,  [r()  R()]  is 
a nonincreasing and continuous function of  w, while  1  - r(.)]  is a 
nondecreasing and continuous function of  w, so that  B(S)  Is a 
continuous function of  w  and 
3B(Z(w, p  ,e)  , p,b(2) ,r—) 
3w 
< 0  (15) 
Conditions (13) and  (15) and the continuity of  B(.)  ensure the 
existence of a unique  that solves (11).  QE.D. 
Using equIlibri.m conditIon (11),  the equilibrium domestic non- 
union wage can  be determined as a function of  p  for fixed values of 
e  and  In particular, for  p  0,  we know from (3) that 
= e.  Further, from their definitions  in (8) and  (114), 
r(.)  and  [r(.)  — (.)]  are nonincreasing In  p  so that 
3B((w,  p,e)  , p,b( 2) 
<0  (16) 
With (15) and  (16),  it follows from (11)  that  < 0  Finally, for 
p = 1,  expression (6)  implies that  Z = 0  which, according to (8) and  (9), 
means that  F(Z(w,p=1,e),b(2))  b(2)  and  R(Z(w,p=1,e),p=1) = 0. 
b(2)  L 
Consequently, (11)  implies that when 
1-b(2) —  16  — 
Is Is assumed that 
rnin 
< e. The relationship describing  as a 
function of  p  implicit in condition (11) Is summarized by the downward 
sloping curve In Figure 3.  For  any exogenous union premium, this curve 
gives the equilibrium value of the domestic non-union wage. 
Model  Union Behavior 
The potential Importance  of making endogenous the pattern of 
production and trade from the standpoint  of determIning the effects of 
foreign competition on union wage—setting behavIor Is brought out by 
noting that trade will have two opposing effects on the optimal union 
wage premium in this model.  On the one hand, the union wage will be 
constrained by international trade  through a higher elasticity of 
derived demand for union labor:  this results from the international 
relocation of production that would occur at the margin in response to 
further increases In the union wage.  On the other hand, the goods whose 
production does remain at home will be those that use relatively 
unintenslvely the services of union labor, and the average labor 
intensity of production in the union  sector will decline:  this effect 
tends to reduce the elasticity of derived demand for union labor, and 
consequently leads to a higher union wage.  If the former effect is 
invariant  with respect to the scope of domestic production, then through 
the latter effect, "Intensification" of foreign competition which 
manifests itself in a narrower scope of domestic production will bring 
about a higher union wage premium, since the increased competition from 
abroad weeds out precisely those firms whose relatively intensive use of —  17  — 
union labor held down the domestic union wage premium.  These results 
are derived  formally  as follows. 
Domestic union membership Is taken as exogenously  determined. 
Union members who do not get jobs In the union sector are assumed to 
find employment in the non-union sector at the prevailing non-union 
wage.  The union is assumed to choose  s  to maximize the rents earned 
by its members, taking the domestic non—union wage and level of world 
income  (Y  L*)  as fixed.!  Domestic union rents can be written as 
f(w,p(w)  ,e) 
fl(s)  [s-w2 f  t(z)d(z;P(z;sfldz 
0 
(17) 
where  d(z;P(z;wfldz  is world demand for 
z c £z,zdz]  and  P(z;s)st(z)+wk(z)  Is 
Income has been suppressed as an argument 
assumptIon taken as given by the domestic 
condition for  the union's problem is 
union sector goods 
the price of good  z.  World 
of demand since it Is by 
union.  The first order 
art(s)  SD(s)  fl(s)  —w)  0 
as 
Manipulation yields an expression for the optimal union premium 
(18) 
(19) 
—DD(w)  w 
where  ri  Is the elasticity of derived  demand  for domestic 
union labor with respect to  s  with  the sign  reversed. —  18  — 
The  derived  demand  elasticity  can  be  broken  into  two 
components,  one  associated  with  changes  in  derived  demand  for  each  union 
good  holding  the  scope  of  domestic  productIon  constant,  and  the  other 
associated  With  changes  in  the  scope  of  domestic  production  itself. 
Explicit  calculation  of  n  yields 
!(wp,e) 
f  A(z;!(w,p,e)p)8(z;p)dz  +  (20) 
a 
where 
2.(z)  9(z) 
G(z;p)  P(z;)  (z) + (1p)k(z) 
Is the domestic union laborts share of production costs for good  z, 
A(z;(w,p,e),p)  Z(w,pe) 
f  b(z)O(z;p)dz 
is the share of derived demand for domestic union labor associated with 
good  z,  and 
C 
— 
w—  A((w,p,e);!(w,p,e)p) 
Is the elasticity of derived demand for domestic union labor associated 
with the International relocation of the productIon of marginal goods. 
According to  (20),  can be written as the elasticity of demand for 
domestic union labor associated with changes In the scope of domestic —  19  — 
production,  o,  iU5  a  weighted average of derived union labor demand 
elasticities across goods produced in the domestic union sector which, 
due to the Cobb-Douglas demand and Leontief technology assumptions, are 
given by the union cost share variable  e(z;p).  L'  The optImal anIon 
premium according to (19)  is simply the inverse of this sum. 
Given  e,  (19) defines the equilibrium  as a function of  w. 
A sufficient condition for  [0,1)  to exIst for a given  w  is that 
e—w 
o  exceed one.  Since (6) implies that  — —f'()  ,  o  wIL. be 
2 
(a—e) 
greater than one over the relevant range of  w's  provided that  f'(•) 
la sufficiently large, I.e.,  provided that variation in labor—capital 
ratios across  z  in the relevant range is not too large.  The second 
order condition will also be met provided that  f'('),  and thus  o,  is 
sufficiently large at the optimum.  This is assumed to be the case. 
Finally, it is assumed that the distribution of budget densities and 
f''(.)  are such that  o  is invariant  with respect to changes in the 
scope of domestic production in the relevant range.  It is then easily 
shown from (19) that, provided second order conditions are met,' 
> 0.  21) 
dw 
The relationship describing  as a function of  w  is Illustrated 
by the upward sloping curve in Figure 3.  For  given values of  w,  this 
curve gives the value of  satisfying the rent—maximizing conditions 
of the union.  The solution to the two equilibrium conditions of the —  20 
model,  equations  (11) and (19),  is illustrated in Figure (3)  as 
(w,p).  Finally, having determined general equilibrium values for  the 
union wage premium and the domestic non—union wage in Figure 3,  Figure 2 
can be used to determine the real wages paid to those employed in the 
union and non—unIon sectors at home, and to labor abroad, and the 
equilibrium pattern of production and trade  The next section explores 
how the endogeneity of the union affects several comparative statics 
results of the model 
ILL  C par  at  lye S  tati  cm 
The  model developed in the previous section can be used to 
illustrate the effects of changes In the international environment on 
union behavior,  This section explores the union response to three 
events:  a shift in consumer preferences toward  non-union goods, the 
imposition of a domestic targeting program aimed at union—sector goods, 
and the international migration of non—union labor. 
Demand Shifts 
Lawrence and Lawrence (1985)  provide an explanatIon for the rising 
union wage premium In the  IJ.S.  over the  period  1970—19814 which  iS  based 
on  a prediction of rising union wage differentials in response  to long 
run declines in demand growth:  the decline in demand growth in the 
union sector reduces the substitution possibilities between capital and 
labor, leading to a less elastic derived demand for union labor and a 
greater wage premium.  The model of section II yields a similar 
relationship between declining union sector demand and  rising wage —  21  — 
differentials,  but for a very different reason. 
Consider an increase in  b(2),  the proportion of income spent on 
the non—union good, accompanied by a proportional decrease in the bidget 
shares of all union sector goods  zs[0,1],  so that  A(z;.)  is 
unchanged for  z  [0,1]  and the budget shares over all final goods 
still sum to one.  The decline in union sector demand  will have no 
affect on the equilibrium relationship between  and  w  given by 
condition (19),  since  b(2)  does not enter (19)  directly (see  the 
definition of  r  given In (20)).  Combinations of  and  w  that 
satisfy (19)  are depicted by the upward sloping curve in Figure 4. 
However,  b(2)  does enter into equilibrium condition (11).  For any 
p>o,  the  Increase in  b(2)  will lead to a domestic trade surplus 
which, according to (11),  requires a rise in  to restore 
b(2)  L* 
equilibrium.  If  p  1,  then (11)  implies that 
1—b(2) 
E min 
so that  W  must rise with an increase in  b(2).  If  p0,  then 
mm 
we and the location of production Is arbitrary, so that changes in 
budget shares have no affect on relative wages.  This is summarized by 
the upward shift in the negatively sloped curve shown In Figure 4, which 
depicts the relationship between  and  p  given in (11). 
At the original  p0, 
the domestic non—union wage is bid up 
relative to the wage of foreign labor due to the shift in preferences 
away from goods of the union sector and toward good 2:  this makes 
domestic union sector production less competitive relative to production 
abroad, and the production of a marginal range of domestic union goods 
is lost to foreigners.  Since the domestic plants that close are the 22 — 
most  labor intensive of the domestic union sector, the sectoral labor 
intensity of  the  domestic union sector declines  inducing the rent— 
maximizing union premium  to rise.  The  new  equilibrium  is illustrated In 
Figure  by  (wT,  p1),  where the  union  premium  has risen  as a result of 
the declining  demand for union sector  goods. 
Fundamentally, it is not  the decline In union sector demand  per se 
but  rather the loss of marginal goods  associated  with It that leads to a 
rise in the domestic union wage premium.  The loss of marginal goods is 
brought about by an increase in the domestic non-union wage resulting 
from the greater demand for domestic non-union workers.  As such, the 
model associates rising union wage premiums with falling union sector 
demand only when, as In the proportional case considered here, the shift 
In demand away from the goods of the union sector results In greater 
demand for the services of domestic non—union labor. 
tin 
As Krugman (1987)  has noted, the case for industrial targeting 
stands or falls with the ability to Identify sectors that "ought" to be 
targeted, where targeting is understood to imply a policy of affecting 
the sectoral pattern of investment rather than its aggregate level. 
Since the choice of the targeted sector will have Implications for the 
scope of domestic union production in the model of section II,  it will 
also affect the union wage premium.  This In turn can provide a reason 
to alter the sectoral mix of investment through a policy of Industrial 
targeting. 
As an illustration of this point,  consider the choice between —  23  - 
allocating  a given amount of R&D expenditures to either the union or the 
non—union sector of the  domestic country, where the direct (cost—saving) 
effect of the R&D results in an  increase in  e  in the targeted 
sector.  Assume that the change in  e  alone would lead to cost re- 
ductions for the domestically produced goods of the sector which imply an 
equivalent increase in utility regardless of the sector chosen for 
targeting.  Thus, from the standpoint of the direct effect of R&D, there 
is no basis upon which to favor one sector over the other. 
If the non—union sector were targeted, all benefits would be 
captured in this direct effect:  the increase in the domestic efficiency 
of the non—union sector and the resulting drop in  P(2)  would be the 
only benefit of the  program, since endogenous variables of the model 
would be unaffected.  Thts is easily seen by noting that  e  enters both 
equilibrium conditions (11) and  (19) only through  (w,p,e),  and hence, 
only in so far as it captures the  lnternatonal technology differences 
in  production of union sector goods.  As such,  the domestic utility 
benefits of R&D applied to the non-union sector are captured completely 
by the resulting price reduction for good 2. 
Not so for a policy of targeting the domestic union sector which, 
in altering the efficiency of production of the marginal union good, 
affects the equilibrium values of  w  and  p.  Specifically, consider 
first the impact of an increase in  e  on equilibrium  condition (11). 
The efficiency parameter  e  enters (11) only through its affect on 
(w,p,e)  as given in expression (6).  Thus,  for any  0 < p <  1,  (6) 
Implies that an increase in  e  would require an equivalent percentage —  24 
increase  In  w  to leave  !(w,p,e),  and hence  B('), unchanged.  But 
this would leave  w  greater than  B(),  and hence for (11)  to he 
satisfied,  must rise by less than the percentage increase in  e, 
For  p = 1  ,  is unaffected by the change in  e  since 
mIn  i-b(2) 
while for  p = 0,  (3) Implies that  = e  and 
thus  rises by the full increase in  e,  This Information is 
reflected in the upward shift (by less than the percentage increase in 
e) of the negatively sloped  curve in FIgure 5a,  Next consider the 
effect of increasing  e  on equIlibrium conditIon (19),  Holding 
oonstant, (6)  implIes that  w  must rise by the same percentage as  e 
to leave  ,  and  hence  i/n,  unchanged.  Thus, the upward sloping 
curve in Figure Ta shifts up by the same percentage as the change In  e. 
The resulting equilibrium  (w1,p,) 
Is given in Figure Os.  At the 
orIginal  p0, 
the soope of domestic union sector productIon  would 
increase as a result of the targeting program, since according to  (ii) 
the domestic non—unIon wage does not rise to fully offset the cost 
savings resulting from the technological advance.  SInce the additIonal 
plants added to domestic union sector produotion  are more labor 
intensive than existIng domestic production,  the seotoral labor 
intensity of the domestio union seotor rises, oausing the rent— 
maximizing union premium to fall,  The final equilibrium is given by 
(w,  ,p1) 
,  where the domestic non—union wage has increased and the 
domestic union premium has  fallen as a result of the unIon sector 
targeting. 
The welfare ImplIcations of the change In  w  and  p  Induoed by —  25  — 
union—sector  targeting are illustrated in Figure 5b./  The unit isocost 
lines of the foreign country are given by the solid lines.  Assuming 
that technologies are originally identical, i.e.,  that  e=1,  the 
original unit isocost  lines of the domestic country are given by the 
dashed lines.  With R&D targeted to the  domestic union sector,  e  will 
rise above one in that sector.  Holding  p  fIxed, Figure Sa shows 
that  w  (and thus  r)  rises, but by less than  e,  to  w'.  The dotted 
lines In the two quadrants of FIgure Sb reflect this new equilibrium 
value of  w,  where  p  has been held fixed.  The rise in  w  and  r 
shifts inward the  domestic unit isocost line in the non—union sector, as 
depicted in the left hand quadrant.  In the right hand quadrant, the 
foreign country's unit value isoquant will be the domestic country's 
"e"  value isoquant, since the two countries no longer share 
technologies for production of the union goods,  As such, the domestIc 
union sector's  "e"  isocost line is depicted by the dotted line in the 
right hand quadrant.  At the original  P0, 
it has shifted out, since 
w  (and thus  r)  has  fallen relative to  e. 
Even before allowing  p  to respond, it is apparent from Figure Sb 
that a terms—of-trade argument can be made for targeting the union 
sector in this model, since domestic wages (union  and nonunion) increase 
not only with respect to the prices of domestically produced union 
sector goods (the direct effect), but also with respect to the prices of 
all goods produced abroad (the terms of trade effect).  In contrast, 
targeting the non—union sector leads only to a direct real wage effect 
with respect to the non—union good, since it leaves the (double —  26 
— 
faotoral) terms of tilde unaltered.  This result, however,  has nothing 
to do with the operition of the union per set  it ooours simply because 
the union sictor hap ens to inblude the marginal  good, on whose relative 
prodiabtion  efficiency the relationship  between domestic and foreign 
wages depends..!' 
. 
The real case for targeting the union sector comes  from the 
additional effect  of the tsrgóting policy once the union is allowed to 
relot.  As shown  in Figure 5a,  p  falls, induóingw  to.rise further 
fr•  , ultil thilàóqüilibritat  and  are reached.  The 
4ash-dot lines in Figure Sb reflect this final equilibrium.  The 
adaltiona] welfare gaini to domestic non—union workers that arise from 
thi union response come in the form of lower priced union sector goods 
produced domestically  and lower priced imports from abroad.  As a result 
of the fall in  p  and the accompanying increase in  w,  the domestic 
non-union wage rises with respect to the prices of all goods 
z £  (0,13  the relative wage increase makes foreign produced goods 
more affordable at home, while the drop in  p  lowers the price of 
domestically  produced union sector goods relative to the domestic non- 
union wage.  Finafly, the domestic union members  must benefit in real 
terms as weal from the union's response to the targeting  program, even 
though the union  s Isszmed  to ignore its effect on  w  when choosing 
p.  This is because the drop in the union premium serves to increase 
the domestic non union wage,  and  hence the (iãcred) double factoral 
terms of trade effect of the union response is in this case beneficial 
to domestic union workers. —  27  — 
Therefore,  the reduction in  p  and accompanying increase in  a 
brought about by union sector targeting is welfare enhancing for  the 
domestic economy, and suggests a rationale for caring especially  about 
the  competitiveness"  of the UfliOfl sector.' 
Labor Migration 
International labor mIgration can be represented in the model as a 
change In  .  In  the competitIve model explored in Dornbusch, 
Fischer, and Samuelson (1977),  labor migration from the low wage to the 
high wage country would reallocate the world stock of labor toward the 
country whose marginal—good technology iS most efficient.  This serves 
to expand the world production possIbilities frontier, and makes labor 
in the low wage country better off, though the (original) Inhabitants  of 
the high wage country suffer a welfare decline.  Of course, the 
expansion of world production possibilities ensures that the gainers 
could compensate the losers.  Findlay (1982) has argued in the context 
of a Ricardian model that,  with regard to several well-known notIons of 
distributive justice, free trade cum migration is "just" in that it at 
once expands the world production possibilities and brings about a more 
equal international distribution of Income. 
In the model of section II,  the consequences of labor migration in 
response to International wage differentials can be quite different. 
First, the union can cause the less efficient country to have the  high 
non—union wage, so that (non—union)  labor migration in the dIrection of 
higher wages contracts the world production possibilities frontier. 
Moreover, In response to this migration abroad, the scope of domestic —  28 
production  contracts,  and  the  union  wage  premIum  therefore rIses, 
offseting the real gains that would otherwise accrue to domestic non- 
union workers  and reducIng the amount by which migration closes the 
International non—union wage discrepancy. 
This Is illustrated ifl  FIgures 6a and 6b,  Figure 6a Illustrates 
the initial determination of  and  w  where, as drawn, 
e > I  > w0,  I.e.,  the home country is more efficient In the productIon 
of all  final goods  than the  foreign  country,  but the domestIc union wage 
premium has reduced the domestIc  non—union  wage  below the unitary wage 
of labor  abroad.  The  solid  lines in Figure 6b  reflect  foreign unit 
IS000St  lines, while the  dashed  lines represent the home  country's 
initial  "e"  Isooost lines. 
With the initial domestic non—union wage lower than the wage 
abroad, migration will occur in the direction of the foreign country. 
As such,  (L*/L)  increases, and labor  migrates towards the 
technologically inferior country,  This  wIll have no effect on the 
upward sloping curve In Figure 6a, as can be seen by noting that  () 
does  not enter directly into equilibrium  condition (19).  However, 
equilibrium condition (11) Implies that the downward sloping curve in 
Figure 6a will shift upward:  for  p =  1  ,  the  percentage increase in 
the domestic wage will equal the percentage increase in  (h),  while 
for  p = 0,  equals  e  and Is unaffected  by relative changes in the 
size of the domestic labor force. 
At the initial  p, 
the  increase in the domestic non—union wage 
that results from the exodus of non—union labor will contract the scope —  29  — 
of  union sector production in the home country.  Since the most labor— 
intensive activities are the first to go,  the sectoral labor Intensity 
of production in the domestic union sector declines, inducing a rise in 
p.  The final equilibrium 15 given by  (p1,w1) 
in Eigure 6a,  where 
both the unIon wage premium and the  domestic non-union wage have 
increased as a resclt of the migration. 
The real wage effects of this migration are contained in Figure 
6b.  The dotted lInes represent the final  "c'  isocost lines for the 
home country, and reflect the fact that both  a  and  p  have 
increased.  The implications of the union response to migration for the 
utility of foreign workers Is ambIguous:  for a given domestic non—union 
wage the higher  p  ma<es dornsttc goods more expensive abroad, whIle 
the drop in the domestic non-union wage induced by the increase in  p 
makes them cheaper.  Overall, however, foreign residents must be hcrt by 
the influx of labor, since both  a  and  p  rise.  The effect of the 
union response to migration on the utility of domestic non—union workers 
is unambiguously negative, since the rise in  p  diminishes the 
purchasing power of the domestic non—union wage with respect to 
domestically produced union sector goods, and the induced fall in  a 
makes goods abroad more expensive as well.  The overall effect of the 
migration on domestic non—union residents is ambiguous, however, due to 
the rise in both  a  and  p.  If' domestically produced union goods 
enter with sufficient weight In utility, the (remaining)  domestic non- 
union labor force will be made worse off by the exodus of domestic 
labor. 30 — 
IV,  Conclualon 
CompetitIve trade theory suggests that freely working market forces 
in a world economy will determine optimally the international locatIon 
of production,  and that a country engaged in trade need have no 
addItional concerns over the Identity of sectors operating within Its 
borders.  WhIle recent literature has questioned this result, and points 
toward the potentIal national benefits of the domestic location of 
sectors with certain  attributes, the focus has been primarily on product 
markets."  Moreover,  there is nothing Inherently perverse about  the free 
trade allocation of  productIon across  countries in this literature: 
there simply exist certain sectors that  all  countries would rather have 
operating  within their borders. 
This paper  has focused on  the exIstence  of an optimizing  labor 
union,  and has explored the InteractIon between union wage demands and 
the International pattern of  production and trade.  In the model 
considered,  the scope of domestic production  takes on a special welfare 
siificance  of its own, since it determines in a systematic way the 
characteristics of the set of firms served by the trade union.  A 
broader scope of production at home is associated  with a lower domestic 
union wage premium, while an  'intensification"  of foreign competition 
leads to a hIgher domestic union premium. 
As illustrated in section III,  this relationship implies several 
conclusions concerning the effects of changes in the international 
environment which lead to shifts in the international pattern of 
production.  First, a shift in preferences  away from union sector goods —  3' 
— 
and into the non—union goods of the dcmesti3 oountry will, in driving up 
the domestia non—union wage relative to the wage abroad,  diminish the 
scope of domestic union sector  production and hence reduce the sectore.l 
labor intensity of produ2tion:  this leads to a rise in the rent— 
maximizing domestia  mien wage premium.  As such, the model  predicts a 
rising union premium in the face of declining demand for union 
products.  Seconc, directing domestic  R&D efforts toward the union 
seotor will expand  the scope of anion producticn  and reduce the union 
premium, while R&D  in the non-union sector leaves the scope of union 
sector  production,  and  hence union behavior,  unohangedi  this raises the 
possibility of welfare gains from a progrsm of union sector targeting. 
Finally,  international  labor migration  can have  very different effects 
when  a labor union is present.  In patioular,  the presence of a union in 
the technologically more advanced  country can cause migration  of non- 
union labor to occur  in the direction of the less advanced oountry. 
Moreover, as this migration  takes place,  the union wage  premium is 
driven up,  of festting the welfare  gains  of migration to the remaining 
non—union  population in the domestic country. 
The inveres relationship  between scope of production and the uni3n 
premium which emerges from this model  depends critically  on the notion 
that international differences in union activity are an important 
determinant  of international ocet differences.  An extreme view has been 
adopted here, in that the presence or absence of a union is all that 
distinguishes countries in the model.  The interaction  of labor union 
activity with other determinants  of trade patterns, am well es with the —  32 
— 
actions  of other unions at hose and abroad, is clearly a directIon for 
further research —  33 
— 
Ref  erenees 
Diewert,  W.  Erwin,  "The Effects of Uniontzati0r on Wages  and 
Employment:  A  General Equtlibrturfl Analysis,"  Economic Inq  12, 
(September  197'4):  319—339. 
Dixit, Avinash  K.,  and Gene M. Grossman, 'Trade and Protection  with 
Multistage Production," Review of Economic Studies 9,  (October 
1982): 58359g. 
DornbUsch, Rudiger, Stanley Fischer, and Paul Samuelson, "Comparative 
Advantage, Trade, and payments In a Ricardian Model with a 
Continuum of Goods," American Economic Review 67,  (December 1977): 
823—839. 
Findlay, Ronald, 'International  Distributive Justice," Journal of 
Internatifll  EconOrn1O 13,  (AuguSt 1982): 11g. 
Freeman, Richard, and James L. Medoff, "The Impact of the percentage 
Organized on Union and Nonunion Wages," Review of Economics and 
StatIstiC  63,  (November 1981):  561572. 
Freeman, Richard B.,  and James L. Medoff, 'SubStitut10n Between 
Production Labor and Other Inputs in Unionized and NonunioniZed 
manufaCtUring," Review of EconomiCSad5t5t5t5  6, (May  i982) 
220—23  3. 
Grossman,  Gene M.,  'Interflational  Competition and the Unionized Sector," 
Discussion Papers in Economics #29, Princeton UciversitY, 1982. 
Hill, John, "Comparative Statics in General Equilibrium  Models with a 
Unionized Sector," Journal of InterflatiOfll  Economis 16,  (May 
198Z1):  3i5—356. 34 
Hirsch, Barry T..  and Mark C, Banger, "Union  Membership Determination 
and Industry Charaoteristos,"  Southern Economic Journal 50, 
(January 1984): 66579, 
Itoh,  Motoshige, and Kazuharu Kiyono, "Welfare Enhancing Export 
SubsidIes," j2JfllLPolitioalEoonom 95, (February 1987): 115— 
137, 
Johnson, Marry C,, and Peter Mieszkowski, "The Effects of Unionlzatrn 
on the Distribution of Inoome:  A General Equilibrium Approach," 
Quarter.  ourn  of Eooio—ios 8  (Notember  970;  5c9—55 
Jones, Ronald W,,  "Distributions in Factor Markets and the General 
Eouilibrlur  Model of Production " Journal  of Political Eoonomv 73. 
(December  1965): 55Th572, 
Wrugman, Paul R,,  ed,,  Strategic Trade Polioy  and the New Interna1 
EoonomIos,  Cambridge, Mass,: MIT Press, 1986. 
Nrugman, Paul B,,  "Targeted Industrial Poloies: Theory and Evidence," 
in Domlniok Salvatore ed, The New ProtectIonist Threat to World 
Welfare, 1987,  North Holland. 
Lawrence, Collin, and Robert Lawrenoe, "The DispersIon in U.S. 
Manufacturing Wages: An Endgame Interpretation,"  Brookinas Pacers 
conom1oAotivit  1, 1985: 47—106, 
Magee, Stephen, "Factor Market Distortions, Production, Distribution, 
and the Pure Theory of Internationul Trade," Quarterly Journal of 
Eoonomios 85,  (November 1971): 623-643. 
McDonald, Ian H,,  and Robert H. Solow, "Wage Bargaining and Employment," 
American Eoonomio Review 71,  (December  1981): 896—908. - 35  - 
Oswald,  Andrew J.,  "Trade Unions, Wages, and Unemployment:  What Can 
Simple Models Tell Us?"  Oxford Econornio Papers 34,  (November 
1982):  526—545, 
Stalger, Robert  W.,  'Upstream  Monopoly ifl  a  Ricardian Continum—of—Goods 
Trade Model," in Essays in International Trade, Ph.D. Dissertation. 
The University of Michigan, 1985. a 36  — 
Footmotem 
*flij5  paper  has  benefited substantially  fran the detailed  and  insightful 
comments  of  Alan Desrdorff and Robert Stern,  from helpful discussion  wl:th 
John Penoavel,  Guide  Tabellini, and  members of  the  international  Trade 
Seminars at Stanford and Princeton, and  from the very helpful  comments of 
an anonymous referee.  Any  remaining errors are my own. 
21  See,  for example, Johnson  and Mieszlcowski (1970), Jones (1971), 
Magee  (1971),  and Diewert (19710. 
3/  See,  for ixample  Oswald (1982)  and Hill (19810.  Groseman (1982) 
has fooused on modeling the response of union wage demands to an 
increase in international  competition when the union follows a 
seniority layoff  and rehiring rule.  His results suggest that such 
hiring rules could be responsible for the empirical observation 
that seotoral  wages often fail to fall in response to a reduction 
in the price of competing import goods.  The results of this paper 
provide an alternative explanation  for such wage behavior. 
The effect of capital intensity on the derived demand elasticity 
for labor is often cited as one explanation  of greater union 
activity in more capital intensive sectors.  For empirical evidence 
on this relationship, see, for example,  Hirsch and Berger (198*). 
LI  For  example, Ricardian trade theory singles cut technological 
differences as the determinant of trade patterns, while  Hecksoher— 
Ohlln theory focusses on differences in relative factor 
endoieents. -  37  - 
What  is  important  is  not  that  the  elasticity  of  factor  substitution 
is  zero  for  goods  In the  zn1on  sector, but that it is the same 
across goods.  Footnote 7 contaIns a discussion  of varying factor 
substitution elasticities.  Note also that,  at the seotoral level, 
factor substitution will occur in response to changing relatIve 
factor prices, but it will be accomplished by altering the mix of 
goods produced within the sector, rather than by altering the mix 
of factors In the production of any good. 
As noted in Kill (19814),  rent—maximizing behavior Is a special case 
of the  union objective function employed by McDonald and Solow 
(1981),  in which union members are risk neutral.  That the union 
ignores its  effect on the domestic non-union wage and level of 
world income when setting its wage is an assumption which can be 
motivated by thinking of this union as one of many unions, no one 
of which is large enou  to affect agegate variables, but which 
together have a significant impact.  For a paper focussing on many 
small unions in a continuum—of—goods general equilibrium  model, see 
Stalger (1985). 
More generally  the elasticities of factor  substitution and product 
demand will also enter into the  determination of the derived demand 
elasticity for union workers.  However, empirical evidence of 
uniformly low substitution elasticities between union and non—union 
Inputs can be found in Frenan and Medoff (1981,  1982),  and it 
seems natural to focus  on  variations In cost shares  as  the main 
element of heterogeneity  among goods  served by  the union.  Limited 38 
variation in factor substitution and/or demand elasticities across 
goods would complicate but not alter the conclusions of thIs paper. 
9/  The  ZZ  curve is suppressed from figures  5b and 6b since it 
remains unchanged throughout. 
.2/  An  argument for targeting "marginal" goods due to this terms of 
trade effect has been made recently by Itoh and Kiyono (1987). 
10/  The polIcy of targeting analyzed here assumes that the union takes 
as given the government R&D decisIon when It sets lts wage demands 
.Li/  See  Kruan (1986)  for a recent review. -
u
U
'
P
J
ø
t
;
_
-
—
I
t
S
.
g
I
'
C
c
4
U
N
J
-
I
I
(
-
I
L
U
C
C
C
a
C
S3
 
V
Q
;
h
A
f
l
 
)
ø
t
i
1
5
 
%
J
O
'
t
'
n
-
U
O
L
J
 
(
1
 
7
 
(
V
 
1
 -
l
L
L
)
Q
)
(
c
3
0T
 
a
 r
r
 
-
 
-
 
-
 
-
I
I
a
J
-
4
C
—
L
L
\
3
C
C
.
C
C
.a
 
d
l
?
 
I
 
i
'
v
S
 
/
 
/
 
/
 
L
 